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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

TRAN SAl\IERICAN TITLE INS CRANCE COMPANY, FORMERLY PIIORNIX TITLE AND
TRUST COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Respondent,,

Case No.
11921

vs.

UNITED RESOURCES, INC.,
FOHl\IERL Y UNITED TELETRON ICS, INC.
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

STATElHENT OF NATURE OF CASE
Summary judgment was awarded the respondent
in the Third Judicial Court in and for Salt Lake County
based on an Arizona default judgment.

1

DISPOSTON IN LOWER COURT
The judge awarded summary judgment for the
Respondent in the amount of $17 ,650.40 principle,
$19,098.49 accrued interest, $4,000.00 attorney's fees
in obtaining the Arizona judgment, and $20.00 costs.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The appellant seeks a trial on the merits of his
defense of lack of jurisdiction of the Arizona Court to
render such judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
There is no transcript as summary judgment was
awarded the Respondent by the Honorable Stewart
M. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court, Salt
Lake County. After hearing arguments and reviewing
the briefs submitted, the Court reasoned that the Arizona "long arm" statute was clearly applicable and
therefore the Court should give full faith and credit
to the Arizona default judgment against the Appellant.
The only evidence for the lower Court's decision
was the pleadings, including interogatories and the objections to said interrogatories filed by the Appellant.
Copies of the Arizona Judgment were filed with the
Respondent's motion for summary judgment but no
facts were ever allowed to be presented to a Court or
Jury as to the Appellant's affirmatively pleaded defense
2

of the lack of jurisdiction of the Arizona Court over
the Appellant's person, nor were the objections to interrogatories ever ruled upon.
The Appellant's answer reads as follows:
"As an affirmative allegation herein, defendant alleges that if any judgment was obtained
in the State of Arizona and as pleaded herein,
the same was void for the same reason that there
was 1wt proper jurisdiction had of either of these
defendants." (emphasis added)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
LACK OF JURISDICTION OF A COURT
TO RENDER JUDGMENT IS A PROPER DEFENSE TO THE GRANTING OF FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT TO THAT JUDGMENT
BY ANOTHER STATE COURT.
The facts and record of this case show that the
defendant-appellant was never given an opportunity
to present his case on the issue as to the lack of the
Arizona Court's jurisdiction over the appellant corporation. If the appellant had been permitted to do so,
and prevailed as others have before, then the Arizona
judgment would be declared void by the Utah Court
and therefore not entitled to or given full faith and
cre<lit in this state, and a host of evils avoided.
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A case exactly in point is the case of Conn v. Whit·
more, 9 Utah 2d 250, 342 P. 2d 871 ( 1959) , decided by
this Court.
In the above case there was an action brought in
Utah for judgment on an Illinois judgment. The appellant there claimed that he was entitled to full faith
and credit based on his Illinois judgment. The Trial
Court, on the facts presented at trial, held that there
was not sufficient contacts or transactions of business
to satisfy the due process clause and the constitutional
meaning of the Illinois statute allowing personal service of summons on a party outside of the state who had
submitted to the jurisdiction of the foreign Court.
This Court affirmed the lower court's decision that
there was no jurisdiction, and full faith and credit was
not granted, and the Illinois judgment was declared
void. The soliciting of the purchase of a horse by mail,
by a Utah resident, the sending of an agent to inspect
the horse in Illinois, and the mailing of a check for
part payment, did not constitute sufficient "minimum
contacts" under the due process interpretation made
by the Supreme Court in the leading case of Interna·

tional Shoe Company v. State of Washington, 326
U.S. 310, 66 S. Ct. 154, 90 L.Ed. 95 (1945).
In Conn v. Whitmore, this Court states that full
faith and credit will not be automatically granted in
the case of all foreign State judgments, but that it
is the policy of this Court to apply "minimum contacts"
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and due process tests as outlined in the International
Shue and other cases.
" ... \i\T e are further of the opinion that the
alternative to the above holding (lack of jurisdiction) is that if the defendant's acts here were
deemed sufficient to fulfill the requirements of
the Illinois Statute and confer jurisdiction upon
its courts, then the statute would not provide the
"minimum contacts" * * * Such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice' required under the doctrine set forth in the case
of International Shoe v. State of Washington,
supra ( 66 S. Ct. 158), and would therefore be
unconstitutional as not affording due process of
law." ( 9 Utah 2d 253)

In speaking of the out of state appellant in the
above case, this court says: "He claimed 'full faith and
credit' for the judgment which would preclude any
defense upon the merits, but not a challenge to the jurisdiction of the court which entered it." ( 9 Utah 2d 251)
For authority for the above proposition, this Court
cites the case of Williams v. State of North Carolina,
Hl4'5, 325 U.S. 226, 65 S. Ct. 1092, 89 L. Ed. 1577,
and the case of Miliken v. Meyer, 1940, 311 U.S. 457,
61 S. Ct. 339, 85 L. Ed. 278. These cases stand for
the proposition that the full faith and credit clause
operated only with respect to judgments rendered by
a court whose jurisdiction, either as to subject matter
or person, is not impeached. \Vant of jurisdiction over
either the person or the subject matter is open to inquiry
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where a judgment rendered in one state is challenged
in another.
In Conn v. Whitmore this Court examines the new
liberalized trend of the recent "long arm statutes" and
concluded that is reasonable that there must be some
substantial basis for allowing jusidiction over out of
state defendants. This presupposes that the defendant
would have an opportunity to challenge that basis.
This Court ,at 9 Utah 2d 254, states as follows:
"Even under the liberalized view the foregoing
cases represent as to the prerequisites to holding
one subject to personal jurisdiction of the courts
of a foreign state, this requirement remains:
there must be some substantial activity which
correlates with a purpose to engage in a course
of business or some continuity of activity in the
state so that deeming the defendant to be present
therein is f ounde,d upon a realistic basis and i.i
not a mere fiction. That this is so and that a single
act or transaction does not suffice unless it fits
into the above pattern is well established." (emphasis added)
After concluding that the out of state court had
no basis for jurisdiction Chief Justice Crockett goes on
at page 255 to give some of the reasons why a resident
should be entitled to his defense of lack of jurisdiction.
"Brief reflection will bring to mind difficult!es
to be encountered if the ordering of merchandise
in a foreign state by mail and taking delivery
through a designated carri;;'
or
common, is to be deemed doing busmess m .a
foreign state, which will draw one into the orbit
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of the jurisdiction of its courts. This would for
practical purposes obliterate any protection one
might have from being compelled to go to a foreign jurisdiction to def end a lawsuit. A person
contemplating business in another state would
have only two alternatives: either subject himself to the jurisdiction of the foreign court if
any dispute arises, or refrain from doing such
business. This would have a bad effect upon commerce. Mail order houses, for example, accept
and fill orders from all over the country. If they
could sue on their accounts in their own state
where it would be highly inconvenient for outof-sta te customers to defend, then forward the
judgments to the jurisdictions where the customers live, demanding full faith and credit from
them, this would effectively prevent the customers from presenting a meritorious defense where
one existed. The ultimate result would be to dissuade customers from doing business across state
lines by mail. Thus what may seem a temporary
advantage to such businesses, in all likelihood
would be detrimental to them and to business
generally in the long run." (emphasis added)
In determining if individual residents non-manufacturing activities were doing business in a judisdictional sense, the court must examine each case as it
arises, having in mind a duty and desire to balance interests of those involved from different jurisdiction.
Dykes By and Through Dykes v. Reliable Furniture
and Carpet, 277 P. 2d 969, 3 Utah 2d 34.
It is respectfully submitted that there is sufficient
authority and reason for the proposition that this particular
is entitled to have the defense of lack
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of jurisdiction of the Arizona court heard. The full
faith and credit clause of the Constitution does not
preclude the appellant his rights to due process of law
and to have his defense heard on its merits.

POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT l.MPROPERLY
GRANTED SUMl\!IARY JUDG.MENT AS
THERE RElHAINED A GENUNE lSSUE AS '
TO A .MATERAL FACT.

The record on file shows that there was no evidence
allowed or considered on the appellant's defense. As
previously pointed out, the defense was properly plead·
ed in the answer to the complaint and therefore re· '
mained at issue. It cannot be controverted, as pointed
out in Point One of this brief, that the defense is a
genuine issue and also a material fact.
The respondent's second interrogatory requested
was propounded as follows: "State the basis of the con·
tention that the Arizona Court had no jurisdiction over
Defendant." The very fact that it was asked shows
that the respondent recognized that a genuine issue
of a material fact remained. The appellant then properly
served his objection to the interrogatory, stating as
follows: "Interrogatory No. 2 is a request for a legal
opinion or the law of the case, and it is not the subject
of this discovery as far as concerned." The objec·
tions to the interrogatories were never ruled upon.
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which is highly irregular of itself, as summary judgment was granted the respondent. This left a genuine
issue pleaded, and no factual basis, not even one affidavit, as to the appellant's defense of want of jurisdiction. He was given no opportunity to show his
defense on the merits, as it was summarily disposed of
with no factual basis.

U.R.C.P. 56 ( c) is set out here for convenience
and to show that it is elemental that summary judgment is not proper if there is any material fact at issue.

''Motion and Proceeding Thereon. The motion
shall be served at least 10 days before the time
fixed for the hearing. The adverse party prior
to the day of hearing may serve opposing affidavits. The judgment sought shall be rendered
forthwith of the pleadings, depositions, answers
to interogatories, and admissions on file, together
with the affidavits, if any show that there is no
genuine issue to any material fact and that the
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law. A summary judgment, interlocutory in character, may be rendered on the issue
of liability alone although there is genuine issue
as to the amount of damages." (emphasis added)
It is the policy of this court that if any material
issue asserted by the plaintiff is contradicted, then the
contradiction must be taken as true, for purposes of
summary judgment.
"On a motion for summary judgment against
a defendant where some of the facts are in dispute, a judgment can
be rendered
against him only if, on the undisputed facts, the
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defendant has no valid defense." Disabled American Veteran v. Hendrix'son, 9 U. (2d) 152, 154,
340 P. 2d 416 ( 1959).

A similar case in point is that of Hatch v. Sugm·"
house Finance Company, 20 Utah 2d 156, 434 P. 2d
758, (1967). The case was an action by attorneys to
recover for services rendered defendant together with
expenses and out-of-pocket expenditures advanced by
them in connection with their services. From judgment of the Third District Court, Salt Lake County,
Stewart 1\11. Hanson, granting summary judgment, defendant appealed. The Supreme Court held that issues i
as to quantity and reasonable value of legal services
rendered by attorneys to defendant were presented,
precluding summary judgment for attorneys. The case
was reversed and remanded for trial upon the merits. '
This Court in the above cited case at 20 Utah 2d
157 makes the following statement:
"The court, after hearing upon the motion of
the plaintiffs for a summary judgment at which
time no evidence was introduced, took the matter
under advisement and thereafter granted the
plaintiff's motion. It is evident that the court
after considering the
of
parties
the affidavits supportmg the party s contentions
determined that there was no genuine issue of
fact which would necessitate a trial.
'Ve are of the opinion that there was an issue
of fact raised by the pleadings and the counter·
affidavit of the defendant in opposition to the
plaintiff's motion for a summary judgment and
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that
defendant is entitled to have its day in
court m respect to the quantity and the reasonable value of the services rendered by the plaintiffs. Rule 56, U.R.C.P., should not be used
where there are issues of fact in dispute." (emphasis added)
In the above cited case at 20 Utah 2d 158 Justice
Ellett in his concurring opinion says that statements of
fact are not sufficient to sustain a summary judgment
where there are issuse raised by the pleadings. That
is exactly why that case was, and this one should be,
reversed and remanded for a trial on the merits. We
quote further from Justice Ellett:

"The court cannot evaluate evidence on summary judgment, and even at trial the court cannot fix an attorney's fee except where evidence
has been introduced on the matter or a stipulation entered into by the parties as to how the
judge may determine it. See F.M.A. Financial
Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 Utah 2d 80, 404
P. 2d 670; Hurd v. Ford, 74 Utah 46, 276 P.
908." (emphasis added)
The sole purpose of summary judgment is to bar
from the courts unnecessary and unjustified litigation,
and only where it clearly appears that the party against
whom the judgment would be granted cannot possibly
establish a right to recover should such judgment be
granted. Any doubts should be resolved in favor of such
party when summary judgment against him is being
considered. Reliable Furniture Co. v. Fidelity & Guarunty Ins. Underwriter, 16 U. (2d) 211, 398 P.2d 685,
(1965).
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In the above cited case this Court, upon considera,
tion of the record, concluded that there was not sufficient evidence to justify a finding that as a matter of
law the case should have been dismissed. The Court
made the following observations on the existing evils
of summary disposal of a case that would exist if the
case at bar is not remanded also. \Ve quote from 16
Utah 2d 216.

"The summary disposal of a case serves a
salutary purpose in avoiding the time, trouble
and expense of a trial when it is justified. But
unless it is clearly so, there are other evils to be
guarded against. A party with a legitimate cause,
but who is unable to afford an appeal, may be
turned away without his day in court; or, when
an appeal is taken, if a reversal results and a trial
is ordered, the time, trouble and expen">e is increased rather than diminished. It is to avoid these
evils and to safeguard the right of access to the '
courts for the enforcement of rights and the
remedy of wrongs by a trial, and by a jury if
desired, that it is of such importance that tlie
court should take care to see that. the party adversely affected has a fair opportunity to present
his contentions against precipitate action which
will deprive him of that privilege. His
tentions as to the facts should be considered m
light most favorable to him, and_ only it clearly
appears that he could not establish a right to recovery under the law should such action be
111
and any doubts which etcist
be
:
favor of affording him the privilege of a trial.
(emphasis added)

1
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Resolving the doubtful facts in the record in favor
of the appellant it is obvious that he has been denied
his right to a presentation of his defense on the merits
as required by U.R.C.P. 56 (c) and the due process
clause of the constitution. It is respectfully submitted
that the trial court error should be corrected by this
Court.

CONCLUSION
Taking the record on its face the valid defense of
lack of jurisdiction was pled but the opportunity to
prove it was simply never given. There is no basis in
fact or in law for the granting of a summary judgment
which violates the appellant's rights. Therefore, in this
case, it should be remanded for trial on the genuine
issues of a material fad.
Respectfully submitted,
DEAN R. MITCHELL
Attorney for Appellant
530 East 5th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
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